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GENERAL LOCAL RULE 9(g) OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF ILLINOIS AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE: ARE THEY
CONSISTENT?
INTRODUCTION

In 1937, the United States Supreme Court adopted the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' which were intended to
provide a simple, uniform means of governing civil procedure
2
in the federal district courts.

3
Rule 83 of the Federal Rules

grants federal district courts the power to adopt local rules to
govern elements of civil procedure which are not fully covered
by the Federal Rules. 4 Rule 83 requires that any local rule
promulgated by a district court must be consistent with the
Federal Rules." Ostensibly, pursuant to Federal Rule 83, the
1. Hereinafter referred to as the Federal Rules. The Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure became effective September 16, 1938, after consideration by the United States Congress. The Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(June 19, 1934, c. 651, § 1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064; as amended, June 25, 1948,
c. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 961; May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 103, 63 Stat. 104; July
18, 1949, c. 343, § 2, 63 Stat. 446; May 10, 1950, c. 174, § 2, 64 Stat. 158;
July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85-508, § 12(m), 72 Stat. 348; November 6, 1966,
Pub. L. 89-773, § 1, 80 Stat. 1323).
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1966) authorizes the United States Supreme Court
to enact rules governing the civil procedure in the district courts. Section
2072 reads in part:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general
rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the
practice and procedure of the district courts and courts of appeals
of the United States in civil actions, including admiralty and maritime cases, and appeals therein, and the practice and procedure in
proceedings for the review by the courts of appeals of decisions of
the Tax Court of the United States and for the judicial review or
enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commis-

sions, and officers.

See Hopkinson, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Compared
with the Former Federal Equity Rules and the Wisconsin Code, 23
MARQ. L. REv. 159 (1938-39) [hereinafter cited as New Federal Rules];
Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1251
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Local Federal Rules].
2. Monod v. Futura, Inc., 415 F.2d 1170 (10th Cir. 1969); Nasser v.

Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1964); American Fidelity & Cas.

Co. v. All American Bus Lines, 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1951). See also
Local Federal Rules, supra note 1, at 1256.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 83:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof
may from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice
not inconsistent with these rules....
In all cases not provided for
by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in any manner

not inconsistent with these rules (emphasis added).
4. First Nat'l Bank v. Small Business Admin., 429 F.2d 280, 284 (5th
Cir. 1970):
Court procedure may be regulated by local rule when not provided
for in the federal rules and then only 'in a manner not inconsistent
with these rules.' FED. R. Crv. P. 83.
See also Local FederalRules, supranote 1, at 1253.
5. See note 3 supra.
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United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
enacted Local General Rule 9(g) 6 in June, 1975. This rule provides that no more than twenty interrogatories can be served
without leave of court. In order to serve additional interrogatories, a party must file a written motion setting forth the proposed interrogatories and show good cause for their use.7 Local
Rule 9(g) relates directly to the same subject matter as Rule 33
of the Federal Rules." Rule 33 governs the use of interrogatories
as a discovery device. Therefore, Local Rule 9(g) must be
consistent with Federal Rule 33 in order to be considered valid
under Rule 83 of the Federal Rules.
In order to make a determination regarding the validity of
Local Rule 9(g), an examination of the Federal Rules to which
this local rule relates is necessary. The local rule-making power
of Federal Rule 83 will be discussed in order to understand what
requirements a local rule must meet to be considered valid. An
examination of the basic philosophy behind the federal discovery
rules, 9 as governed by Federal Rule 26,10 will determine
whether Local Rule 9(g) is consistent with the spirit and intent
of discovery in the federal district courts. Specifically, subdivision (c) of Federal Rule 26 will be examined to ascertain
whether fixed limitations can be placed on the frequency of use
of a discovery device. The provisions of Federal Rule 33 will
be reviewed in order to determine whether Local Rule 9(g) is
consistent with the intended use of interrogatories as a discovery
device. This comment will also include a discussion of the purpose of Local Rule 9(g) and how the same results can be achieved
through application of Federal Rule 37.11

Finally, the means

available to an attorney who might wish to challenge the validity
of Local Rule 9(g), as well as the difficulties involved in making
such a challenge, will be investigated.
RuLE 83

The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
6. Hereinafter referred to as Local Rule 9(g). The rule states:
Rule 9. Form of Papers Filed

(g) No party shall serve on any other party more than twenty (20)

interrogatories in the aggregate without leave of court. Subparagraphs of any interrogatory shall relate directly to the subject matter of the interrogatory. Any party desiring to serve additional interrogatories shall file a written motion setting forth the proposed
additional interrogatories and the reasons establishing good cause for
their use. Any such motion shall be subject to the provisions of Rule
13 of the General Rules of this Court. [Added 6/20/75.]
7. Id.
8. See note 39 infra.

9. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
10. For text of Rule 26 see note 27 infra.
11. For text of Rule 37 see note 75 infra.

Local Rule 9(g)

19761

Judicial Conference of the United States 1 2 intended to govern
most aspects of procedural law in the federal district courts
through application of the Federal Rules. 1 3 It was recognized,
however, that certain procedural matters of a unique and local
4
nature could be governed more adequately by local rules.1
The Advisory Committee suggested, as an example, that a local
rule may be used to govern "the time for and conduct of oral
arguments to the court and jury."' 5 Federal Rule 83 was
enacted to enable the district courts to promulgate local rules
which would govern such unique aspects of procedure. 18 However, Rule 83 was never intended to allow district courts to pass
innumerable local rules indiscriminately. 17 Rather, Federal
Rule 83 was expected to allow local district courts to make ad
hoc decisions in those cases where an unusual and infrequent
question of procedure arose and to pass local rules where a prevalent procedural problem occurred, with emphasis on decisionmaking rather than on rule-making.'
This interpretation of
Rule 83 was necessary to avoid the possibility that numerous
local rules would destroy the uniformity that the Federal Rules
were designed to accomplish.' 9
To meet the requirements of Federal Rule 83, a local rule
must deal with an aspect of procedure not fully covered by the
Federal Rules 20 and must be consistent with the general intent
of the Federal Rules. 2" A local rule, therefore, "can neither
detract from nor add to the rights and limitations contained in
the Federal Rules. '2 2 Since Local Rule 9(g) directly affects
12. Hereinafter referred to as the Advisory Committee.
13. See Local Federal Rules, supra note 1, at 1256.
14. Id. at 1255.
15. Id.
16. Id.

17. Id. at 1276.
Federal judges, almost without exception, seem to be unaware that
one purpose of the Rule's authors was to keep the rule-making to
a minimum.
18.

See also C.

WRIGHT

&

A.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND

PRO-

§ 3155 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER];
Local Federal Rules, supra note 1, at 1255.
19. See Local Federal Rules, supra note 1, at 1256:
If the district courts continued to use the Rule 83 rule-making power
to 'add meticulous details, that they think improve the Supreme
Court rules, simplicity and flexibility will be impaired, and uniformity will be destroyed. .. .'
The article quotes William Mitchell, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules.
20. See note 4 supra.
21. Jefferson v. Asplund, 467 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1972); Dickinson Supply, Inc. v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 423 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1970);
cEDuRE:

CnmL

Cedolia v. C.S. Hill Saw Mills, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 524 (M.D.N.C. 1967);

Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 285 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1960); Bogatay
v. Montour R.R. Co., 177 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Pa. 1959).

22. Fagan v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., Inc., 13 F.R. Serv. 2d 59a.63,
Case 1 (S.D. Ill. 1969).
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the discovery rules, it must be consistent with those rules if it
is to be considered valid under Federal Rule 83.
DiscovERY RULES
The discovery rules under present federal procedure serve
to narrow the issues that will be contested, to obtain evidence
that can be used at trial, and to secure information as to the
existence of evidence which may be used at trial. 23 These
functions of the discovery rules enable a litigant to prepare adequately for trial. 24 The importance of the discovery rules was
explained by the United States Supreme Court in Hickman v.
Taylor.25 In Hickman, the Court stated that under prior federal practice the pleadings were used to ascertain the facts and
issues in a particular case before trial. The pleadings proved to
be inadequate for this purpose and restricted the parties in their
discovery attempts. The Federal Rules replace the pleadings as
a pre-trial discovery device and allow the parties to prepare more
adequately for trial by enabling the "parties to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial. ' 26
Rule 26
Federal Rule 2627 contains the general provisions governing
discovery that relate to all the discovery devices contained in
23. See Carlson Cos., Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp.
1080 (D. Minn. 1974); Wood v. Todd Shipyards, 45 F.R.D. 363 (S.D. Tex.
1968); Berry v. Haynes, 41 F.R.D. 243 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
24. WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote 18, § 2001.
25. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
26. Id. at 500-01.
27. FED. R. Cr. P. 26(a), (b) (1), (c) and (d):
GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY
(a) DIsCOVRY MrrroDs. Parties may obtain discovery by one
or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property,
for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission. Unless the court orders otherwise
under subdivision (c) of this rule, the frequency of use of these
methods is not limited.
(b) ScoPE OF DIscovERY. Unless otherwise limited by order of
the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is
as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of
any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
(c) PROTECTIVE ORDERS.

Upon motion by a party or by the per-
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Federal Rules 26 to 37. A brief examination of Rule 26 will
explain the basic philosophy behind the discovery rules and the
power of the district courts to control the use of discovery.
In order to allow a litigant to prepare adequately for trial,
the discovery rules, as governed by Rule 26, have been consistently interpreted as providing for broad and liberal discovery
of all matters relevant to the facts and issues in a pending
action. 28 In 1970, the discovery rules were amended and reorganized. 29 As a result of this reorganization, Federal Rule 26
son from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the
court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition
is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be
had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by
a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking
discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the
scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated
by the court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only
by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed
or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part,
the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that
any party or person provide or permit discovery. The provisions
of Rule 37 (a) (4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation
to the motion.
(d) SEQUENCE AND TIMING OF DiscovERY. Unless the court upon
motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used
in any sequence and the fact that a party is conducting discovery,
whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any
other party's discovery.
As amended December 27, 1946, ef. March 19, 1948; January 21, 1963,
eff. July 1, 1963; February 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; March 30, 1970,
eff. July 1, 1970.
28. Canuso v. City of Niagara Falls, 7 F.R.D. 159, 160 (W.D.N.Y.
1945):
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are most liberal in their provisions entitling a party to pre-trial examination of parties and witnesses, and those rules have quite uniformly been so construed by
the courts.
Accord, e.g., Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 64 F.R.D. 62 (E.D. Pa.
1974); Roto-Finish Co. v. Ultramatic Equip. Co., 60 F.R.D. 571 (N.D. Ill.
1973); Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 58 F.R.D.
348 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Peterson v. United States. 52 F.R.D. 317 (S.D. Ill.
1971); Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 424 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1970); Spier
v. Home Ins. Co., 404 F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1968): Gen. Tel. & Elec. Lab.,
Inc. v. Nat'l Video Corp., 297 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
29. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE RELATING TO DISCOVERY,

ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S EXPLANATORY STATEMENT CONCERNING AMENDMENTS OF THE DisCOVERY RULES, 48 F.R.D. 487 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 ADvIsoRY
COMMITTEE NOTE].
In Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,

444-45 (1946), the United States Supreme Court stated that the statements of the draftsmen of the Rules are relevant to their interpretation.
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now contains the general provisions that govern all the discovery
rules. 30

Subdivision (a) of Rule 26 lists the different methods

by which pretrial discovery may be made.3 ' The broad and liberal interpretation accorded the discovery rules since their enactment in 1938 is specifically propounded in subdivision (b) (1).32
Subdivision (b) (1) states in pertinent part that parties may
obtain discovery of any matter that is both relevant to the subject matter of the pending action and not privileged. The party
from whom discovery is sought can not object that the information sought is inadmissible at trial if such information is "calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.133 The language used in framing this subdivision makes it clear that parties to an action are permitted to use discovery quite liberally.
However, notwithstanding the liberal concepts embodied in subdivisions (a) and (b) of Federal Rule 26, these subdivisions do
allow the district court to limit discovery. Subdivision (a) permits a court to limit the frequency of use of the discovery
methods3 4 and subdivision (b) enables the court to limit the
scope of discovery.3 5 Since Local Rule 9(g) places a limitation
on the frequency of the use of the discovery device of interrogatories, it relates directly to subdivision (a) of Federal Rule 26.
The last sentence of subdivision (a) states that the frequency
of use of the discovery methods is not limited, except as the court
may order under subdivision (c) of Rule 26. Subdivision (c) of
Federal Rule 26 allows a court to issue protective orders to limit
discovery if it can be shown that discovery is being abused. Subdivision (c) states in part that the court in which the action is
pending may make any order necessary to protect a party from
improper discovery if that party moves the court for a protective
order and is able to show good cause for the issuance of such
an order.3 ( Federal Rule 26(c) provides protection for parties
who are able to show that the discovery sought is annoying,
embarrassing, oppressive, unduly burdensome or expensive.
The Rule requires, however, that a protective order be issued
only after a party has shown good cause3 7 based on the facts
30. See 1970 ADvIsORY CoMMITTEE NoTE, supra note 29, at 490; WRIcHT
& MILLER, supra note 18, § 2001.
31. See note 27 supra, subdivision (a) of Rule 26.
32. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2007.
33. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (1970). The full text of subdivision (b) (1)

is contained in note 27 supra.
34. See note 27 supra, last sentence of subdivision (a).
35. See 1970 ADVISORY COMMITTEE NoTE,supra note 29, at 498; WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 18, § 2007.
36. See note 27 supra,subdivision (c).

37. See, e.g., Advance Labor Service, Inc. v. Hartford Accident &

Indem. Co., 60 F.R.D. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D.
337 (E.D. Pa. 1972); White v. Wirtz, 402 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1968). (Prior
to 1970, Rule 30(b) contained the provisions for protective orders. In

1970, subdivision (b) of Rule 30 was transferred to Rule 26 (c)).
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and circumstances of a particular case. 8s Thus, any limitation
on the frequency of use of a discovery method must be based
on the facts and circumstances of that particular case. Federal
Rule 26(c) does not give a district court the power to place a
fixed or blanket limitation on the frequency of use of a discovery method in all cases litigated in a particular district. In the
event such a power were to be given to a district court, the broad
and liberal interpretation accorded the discovery rules could be
negated by indiscriminate judicial interference.
Since the court can place limitations on discovery only after
consideration of the facts peculiar to each case, any fixed limitation on the frequency of use of a discovery device would be
inconsistent with the provisions of Federal Rule 26(c). Local
Rule 9(g) places just such a fixed limitation on the use of the
discovery device of interrogatories by requiring leave of court
to serve more than twenty interrogatories. Therefore, Local
Rule 9(g) appears to be inconsistent with Federal Rule 26.
Since Federal Rule 33 governs the use of interrogatories, an
examination of this Federal Rule will explain why the limitation
of leave of court is inconsistent. It will also be seen that Local
Rule 9(g) alters the basic concept that the party making an
objection to an interrogatory has the burden of proof as to the
impermissibility of that interrogatory.
Rule 33
Federal Rule 33 deals with the service of interrogatories upon
a party.8 9 This rule is given the same broad and liberal inter38. Krortz v. United States, 56 F.R.D. 555 (W.D. Va. 1972); Stoneybrook Tenants Ass'n Inc. v. Alpert, 29 F.R.D. 165 (D. Conn. 1961); Hoffman v. Wilson Line, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 73 (E.D. Pa. 1946); WRIGHT & MLLFR,
supra note 18, § 2036.
39. FE. R. Cr. P. 33(a) and (b):
INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES
(a) AvAIABiLrry; PROCFUREs FOR Us. Any party may serve
upon any other party written interrogatories to be answered by the
party served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation
or a partnership or association or governmental agency, by any officer or agent, who shall furnish such information as is available to
the party. Interrogatories may, without leave of court, be served
upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any
other party with or after service of the summons and complaint upon
that party.
Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in
writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the reasons for objection shall be stated in lieu of an answer. The answers
are to be signed by the person making them, and the objections
signed by the attorney making them. The party upon whom the
interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers,
and objections if any, within 30 days after service of the interrogatories, except that a defendant may serve answers or objections
within 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon that
defendant. The court may allow a shorter or longer time. The
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pretation as all other discovery devices listed under Federal Rule
26.40 The history of Federal Rule 33 is useful to obtain an
understanding of why leave of court is no longer required to
serve any number of interrogatories.
Originally, in 1938, Federal Rule 33 contained a sentence
which limited to one the number of sets of interrogatories that
41
could be served on an opposing party without leave of court.
In 1946, this provision was stricken and the following language
was added:
The number of interrogatories or of sets of interrogatories to
be served is not limited except as justice requires to protect the
party from annoyance, expense, embarrassment or oppres-

sion

.... 42

Leave of court was no longer required to serve interrogatories
unless service was made within ten days of the commencement
of the action. The ten day period was to allow the defendant
time to engage counsel and prepare his case. 48
The Advisory
Committee Notes clearly state that the number of interrogatories
to be served can not be limited to a specific number, "but that
a limit may be fixed only as justice requires . . . in individual
44
cases."
Under the 1946 version of Federal Rule 33, it was obvious
that Local Rule 9(g) was inconsistent in that it fixed a numerical limitation beyond which leave of court was required. Howparty submitting the interrogatories may move for an order under
Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or other failure to
answer an interrogatory.
(b) ScoPE; USE AT TRIAL. Interrogatories may relate to any
matters which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b), and the
answers may be used to the extent permitted by the rules of evidence.
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely because an answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to
fact, but the court may order that such an interrogatory need not
be answered until after designated discovery has been completed or
until a pre-trial conference or other later time.
As amended December 27, 1946, eff. March 19, 1948; March 30, 1970, eff.
July 1,1970.
40. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Felix A. Thillet, Inc. v.
Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 41 F.R.D. 55 (D. Puerto Rico 1966); Klauser
v. Sidney Printing & Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 783 (D. Kan. 1967);
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2165; 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
33.10 (2d ed. 1975).
41. See REPORT Or PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CvrL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE
ADVisoRy COMMITTEE, 5 F.R.D.433 461 (1946).

42. Id. at 461 (emphasis added).
43. Id., Notes.
44. Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
At the same time, it is provided that the number of or number of
sets of interrogatoriesto be served may not be limited arbitrarily
or as a general policy to any particular number, but that a limit
may be fixed only as justice requires to avoid annoyance, expense,
embarrassment or oppression in individual cases. The party interro-
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ever, Federal Rule 33 was amended in 1970, 4 and the provision
dealing with the unlimited number of interrogatories was
stricken. The Advisory Committee, however, made it clear that
no change in the substance of the rule was intended. The
Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule 33 state:
Certain provisions are deleted from subdivision (b) because
they are fully covered by new Rule 26(c) providing for protective orders and Rules 26(a) and (d). The language of the
subdivision is thus simplified without any change of substance.46
The Advisory Committee refers to subdivisions (a), (c) and (d)
of Federal Rule 26. A review of these subdivisions will reveal
that they do not allow a federal district court to place fixed
limitations on the frequency of use of a discovery device.
The last sentence of Federal Rule 26 (a) states that "[u] nless
the court orders otherwise under subdivision (c) of this rule, the
frequency of use of these methods is not limited." The Advisory
Committee's Notes on subdivision (a) of Federal Rule 26 explain
the meaning of this last sentence: "The provision that the frequency of use of these methods is not limited confirms existing
law. It incorporates in general form a provision now found in
Rule 33."47 The provision referred to in Federal Rule 33 was
the language added in 1946 that the number of interrogatories
was not to be limited by a fixed number. As discussed earlier,
Federal Rule 26(c) allows the court to limit the frequency of
use of a discovery method only when good cause is shown based
on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Federal Rule
26(d) simply governs the sequence and timing of discovery. 48
The 1970 amendment, therefore, was by no means an expansion
by the Advisory Committee of the authority of a local district
court to restrict the number of interrogatories that can be
served without leave of court. Rather, it was clearly intended
to continue the post-1946 application, and the number of sets of
interrogatories is still not to be limited by a fixed formula.
The Advisory Committee stated that one of the reasons for
the 1970 amendment was to "encourage extrajudicial discovery
with a minimum of court intervention. ' 49 This was accomplished in Federal Rule 33 by three changes. 50 First, the time
gated, therefore, must show the necessity for limitation on that basis.
It will be noted that in accord with this change the last sentence
of the present rule, restricting the sets of interrogatories to be served,
has been stricken.
45. See note 39 supra.
46. 1970 ADVISORY Co!wlrVmrI
NoTE, supra note 2D, at 524 (emphasis

added).
47. Id. at 498.

48. See note 27 supra, subdivision (d).
49. 1970 ADVisORY CoMMrrrEE NOTE, supra note 29, at 488.
50. Id. at 522-23.
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within which to answer interrogatories was increased to 45 days
for a defendant, after service of summons and complaint, and
30 days for any other party, after service of summons and complaint. Under the 1946 version of Federal Rule 33, an interrogated party had 10 days within which to serve objections to
interrogatories and 15 days to serve answers. The Advisory
Committee felt that these time periods were too short and
encouraged objections as a means to gain time within which
to answer interrogatories. 51 As will be seen under the third
change, these objections usually lead the parties into court.
The second change removed the requirement of leave of
court for early discovery. Prior to 1970, leave of court was
required of the plaintiff if he wished to serve interrogatories
within 10 days after commencement of the action. The 10 day
period was to allow the defendant time within which to employ
counsel before a response was due to interrogatories. The
Advisory Committee felt that this protection of the defendant
was "adequately fulfilled"' 2 by the enlarged time within which
to answer and the fact that interrogatories would be served with
53
or after service of the summons and complaint.
The third change dealt with which party would move the
court for a resolution of any objections. Before 1970, the interrogated party had to serve a notice of hearing along with objections
to any interrogatories considered impermissible. The 1970
amendment removed the requirement that a notice of hearing
be served by the interrogated party. It is now up to the interrogator to seek judicial intervention to resolve a dispute over
interrogatories. The interrogator, of course, does not have to
seek the aid of the court but can attempt to resolve the dispute
between the parties informally. This prevents an automatic
54
hearing on any objections.
The Advisory Committee felt these changes would reduce the
need for "court intervention"5 5 and encourage out-of-court
resolution of problems that arose due to use of interrogatories
during discovery. 6 Local Rule 9(g) reinstates the restriction
of leave of court by requiring the court's approval to serve more
than twenty interrogatories. This necessitates an additional
court appearance which is not required under Federal Rule 3357
51. Id.

52. Id. (quoting the Advisory Committee).

53. Id.
54. Id.

55. Id. (quoting the Advisory Committee).

56. Id.
57. See Blair, A Guide to the New Federal Discovery Practice, 21
DRAKE

L. REv. 58, 69 (1971-72)

covery].

[hereinafter cited as A Guide to Dis-

Each question must be answered, either by responding with the re-
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and defeats the purpose of the 1970 amendment by requiring
judicial intervention. Obviously, Local Rule 9(g) is inconsistent
with Federal Rule 33 in this regard.
Since leave of court is not required by Federal Rule 33 to
begin or continue discovery, the interrogating party is not
required to justify his interrogatories to a district court judge.
Federal Rule 26(c) does require a showing of good cause, but
it is the party being interrogated who must show such cause
when seeking a protective order to limit discovery. 58 It has
traditionally been the burden of the interrogated party to prove
that the interrogator has stepped beyond the permisssible limits
of discovery and should be controlled by the power of the district court. 59 Local Rule 9(g), however, requires the interrogator to show good cause when desiring to serve more than twenty
interrogatories.60 Thus, the burden of proof as to the permissibility of an interrogatory is switched from the interrogated
party to the interrogating party. This restricts discovery by
forcing an interrogator to prove his interrogatories acceptable
before any objection may be raised by the other party and by
requiring a court appearance that is not necessary under Federal Rule 33. The switch in the burden of proof directly contradicts the procedure established by the Advisory Committee:
(3)
If objections are made, the burden is on the interrogating party to move under Rule 37(a) for a court order compelling answers, in the course of which the court will pass on
the objections. The change in the burden of going forward does
not alter the existing obligation of an objecting party to justify
his objections.61
6 2
The United States Supreme Court, in Miner v. Atlass,
held that local rules which make basic procedural changes are
quested information or by objecting to the interrogating party (emphasis omitted). Answers and objections are served together, and
there is no general resort to court at this time. The interrogating
party then examines the answers and objections, and he may seek
to settle the objections informally or move to compel discovery
under Rule 37. It is only at this last-mentioned occasion of a motion
to compel discovery that interrogatory practice comes before the
court (emphasis added).
The 1970 amendment removed any requirement for leave of court and
a court appearance is only necessary if a problem arises. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
58. WRIGHT & MLLER, supra note 18, § 2035: "The rule requires that
good cause be shown for a protective order. This puts the burden on
the party seeking relief to show some plainly adequate reason therefor."
59. Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 477 (W.D. Mo.

1950); United States v. Purdome, 30 F.R.D. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1962); Essex

Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Intercontinental Fibres, Inc. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 952 (Cust. Ct.
1972); United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, 66 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Ill. 1975).
60. See note 6 supra.
61. 1970 ADVISORY COMMITTEE NoTE, supra note 29, at 523 (emphasis

added).
62. 363 U.S. 641 (1960) [hereinafter referred to as Miner].
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invalid. In Miner, the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois enacted a local rule, pursuant to Rule 44 of the General
Admiralty Rules,63 that allowed discovery depositions to be
taken in admiralty cases. At that time, no General Admiralty
Rule permitted discovery depositions.64 The Court held that
providing for discovery depositions through local rules was a
"change so basic"6 5 that it could not "be effectuated through the
local rule-making power"6 6 granted the federal district courts
by General Admiralty Rule 44.
Switching the burden of proof as to the permissibility of an
interrogatory to the interrogator is a basic procedural change
that cannot be accomplished through local rules, as held in Miner.
The switch in the burden of proof is not only a complete reversal
of the procedure established under Federal Rule 33, but also
undermines the broad and liberal interpretation accorded the discovery device of interrogatories.6 7 Rather than allowing discovery to proceed until a problem arises between the parties
which requires judicial intervention, 8 Local Rule 9(g) prevents
discovery until an interrogator satisfies the district court that
more than twenty interrogatories should be allowed. This basic
change is inconsistent with the provisions and interpretation of
Federal Rule 33 and exceeds the limits of the local rule-making
power of the federal district courts.
Local Rule 9(g), therefore, is inconsistent with the Federal
Rules in three major respects. First, Local Rule 9(g) places a
fixed limitation on the number of interrogatories which can be
served without leave of court and is thereby inconsistent with
Federal Rules 26 (c) and 33, which do not permit fixed limitations.
Second, the requirement of leave of court to serve more than
twenty interrogatories is inconsistent with the philosophy incorporated in the 1970 amendment of Federal Rule 33, which
removed the requirement of leave of court and increased the time
allowed to answer, in order to avoid judicial intervention. Third,
Local Rule 9(g) requires an interrogator to prove the necessity
and permissibility of any interrogatories over twenty which are
to be served on a party. This is contrary to the established procedure whereby an objecting party must show why an interrogatory is not permissible and is a basic change of procedure which
cannot be made through local rules. Thus, Local Rule 9(g) is
63. General Admiralty Rule 44 is very similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
See Local Federal Rules, supra note 1, at 1251 n.3.
64. Miner was decided in 1960. In 1961, the United States Supreme
Court adopted a discovery-deposition rule for admiralty cases. See Arm.
R. 30 A., 368 U.S. 1023 (1961).
65. 363 U.S. at 650.
66. Id.
67. See note 40 supra.
68. See note 57 supra.
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clearly inconsistent with the relevant Federal Rules and must,
therefore, be considered invalid under the provisions of Federal
Rule 83.69 Furthermore, any abuses of discovery stemming from
the use of interrogatories are already governed by the provisions
of Federal Rule 37,70 as will be explained below.
REASONS

BEHIND THE ENACTMENT OF

ITS EXPECTED

LocAL

RULE

9(g)

AND

INFLUENCE ON THE USE OF rNTERROGATORIES

The Honorable Hubert L. Will, a member of the Executive
Committee of the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, gave three fundamental reasons for the enactment of
Local Rule 9 (g): 71
(I) To force interrogatories into proper perspective as a
device that will disclose the identity of persons having knowledge
of the subject matter of the law suit, reveal the location and
categories of relevant documents, narrow the issues and disclose
the location and existence of other evidence rather than being
used to obtain evidence itself;
(II) To lessen the number of objections to interrogatories
and answers to interrogatories by reducing the number of opportunities for objection, thereby freeing the courts from the present
time-consuming hearings on such objections; and
(III) To help lower the costs to the litigants created by the
use of interrogatories as a discovery device.
Judge Will feels that too many interrogatories are served
which attempt to secure evidence for use at trial, rather than
merely locating evidence and ascertaining the relevant issues.
He further stated that, for the most part, no real evidence is
acquired regarding contested facts through use of interrogatories
because most answering parties will do their best not to admit
something in an answer that can be used as evidence at trial.
This is accomplished by giving evasive answers to direct questions concerning any contested fact. The only evidence that will
be obtained through interrogatories would involve uncontested
facts, which Judge Will feels can be obtained more easily by
73
stipulations 72 or requests for admission.
Judge Will stated that depositions and other discovery
devices are more practical to obtain evidence and should be used
69. See text accompanying notes 12-22 supra.
70. See note 75 infra.
71. The following section, dealing with the reasons for enactment of
Local Rule 9(g) and its expected results, is based on an interview with
Judge Will. Judge Will introduced Local Rule 9(g) to the judges of
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, who adopted the
rule unanimously.
72. See Fan. R. Civ. P. 29.
73. See FED. R. Civ. P. 36.

936

The John Marshall Journalof Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 9:923

instead of interrogatories to acquire evidence concerning contested facts. As he explained, interrogatories are not a viable
substitute for depositions in discovering evidence and only a few
interrogatories are necessary to narrow the issues and determine
where evidence may be found.

The requirement that a party

wishing to serve more than twenty interrogatories must seek
leave of court and show good cause for additional interrogatories
is expected to discourage the use of interrogatories as a device
to discover evidence for use at trial by giving the district court

power to deny the request if it believes the interrogatories go
beyond the limited purposes of discovering where evidence may
be found and narrowing the issues.
(I)

Proper Perspective

Interrogatories are a discovery device which allow a party
to obtain facts, narrow issues, reduce the chance of surprise and
initially aid in trial preparation.7 4 If interrogatories are being
misused or abused, the district court has the power to control
any alleged abuses of discovery through application of Rule 37
of the Federal Rules. 75 Federal Rule 37 allows for control of
74. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); United States v. Article of
Drug, Etc., 43 F.R.D. 181 (D. Del. 1967); WIGHT & MILLER, supra note
18, § 2183.
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a), (b) and (c).
FAILURE TO MAKE DISCOVERY: SANCTIONS
(a) MoTioN FOR ORDER COMPELLING DIscovERY. A party, upon
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby,
may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows:
(1) Appropriate Court. An application for an order to a party
may be made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on
matters relating to a deposition to the court in the district where
the deposition is being taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the court in the district
where the deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rules 30 or 31, or a corporation or other
entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b) (6) or 31(a),
or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule
33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted
under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering
party may move for an order compelling an answer, or a designation,
or an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request.
When taking a deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the
question may complete or adjourn the examination before he applies
for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make
such protective order as it would have been empowered to make on
a motion made pursuant to Rule 26 (c).
(3) Evasive or Incomplete Answer. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure
to answer.
(4) Award of Expenses of Motion. If the motion is granted, the
court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney
advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party
the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including
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evasive answers that prevent the discovery of evidence in regard
attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for
hearing, require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed
the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion,
including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the making of
the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court
may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the
motion among the parties and persons in a just manner.
(b) FAIUPE TO COMPLY wrru ORDER.
(1) Sanctions by Court in District Where Deposition is Taken.
If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being
directed to do so by the court in the district in which the deposition
is being taken, the failure may be considered a contempt of that
court.
(2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. If a party
or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b) (6) or 31 (a) to testify on behalf of a party
fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an
order made under subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, the court
in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to
the failure as are just, and among others the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was
made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established
for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the
party obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support
or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by
default against the disobedient party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto,
an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any
orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under
Rule 35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such
orders as are listed in paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to
produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the
court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney
advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the
failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust.
(c) ExPousEs ON FAIIrRE TO Armrr. If a party fails to admit
the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions
thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of
the matter, he may apply to the court for an order requiring the
other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making
that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall
make the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was
of no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had
reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter,
or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
As amended December 29, 1948, eff. October 20, 1949; March 30, 1970,
eff. July 1, 1970.
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to contested facts.76 The United States Supreme Court criticized
the use of means other than Federal Rule 37 to control abuse of
77
discovery in Societe Internationale v. Rogers.
Societe dealt with the inability of the plaintiff to obtain
records sought by the defendant because the Swiss government
confiscated the records after it was determined by the Swiss Federal Attorney that disclosure of these records would violate Swiss
penal laws. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure
of full production under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules and
its own inherent power. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorariand Justice Harlan spoke to the issue of dismissal under Rule 41(b) and the inherent power of the court.
Justice Harlan stated that a court's power "to dismiss a complaint because of non-compliance with a production order depends exclusively upon Rule 37" and that resort to Rule 41(b) or
the inherent power of the court would "only obscure analysis of
the problem" pertaining to non-compliance with a discovery
78

order.

As amended in 1970, Federal Rule 37 made the holding in
Societe applicable to the problem of evasive answers. Federal
Rule 37(a) (3) specifically states that "an evasive or incomplete
answer is to be treated as a failure to answer. ' 79 This allows
the interrogator to seek a court order under Federal Rule
37(a) (2) compelling the interrogated party to give a proper
answer. If the interrogator prevails on this hearing, the interrogated party must show that he did not act unjustifiably in giving an evasive answer or the court must award the cost of the
motion to the interrogator.8 0 If the interrogated party still
refuses to give a direct answer, the court has the power under
Federal Rule 37(b) to enforce even more severe sanctions. 81
The award of costs in subdivision (a) (4) and the sanctions under
subdivision (b) of Federal Rule 37 were meant to discourage
82
unjustified non-compliance with discovery.
Judge Will stated that the only evidence that might be

obtained through the use of interrogatories would involve uncontested facts which could be obtained more easily by stipulations
76. Id. § (a) (3).

77.
78.
79.
80.

357 U.S. 197 (1958) [hereinafter referred to as Societe].
Id. at 207.
See note 75 supra.
1970 ADVisORY Com'miTTz NoT, supra note 29, at 539; WsiGHr &
MrLLEM, supra note 18, § 2288.
81. See note 75 supra, subdivision (b); Brown, Proposed Changes to
Rule 33 Interrogatoriesand Rule 37 Sanctions, 11 ARiz. L. REv. 443 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Changes to Rules 33 & 37].
82. See Proposed Changes to Rules 33 & 37, supra note 81, at 447;
WRiGHT & mILER, supra note 18, § 2288; A Guide to Discovery, supra

note 57, at 75.
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or requests for admissions. The judge explained that parties
must stipulate to all uncontested facts as part of the final pretrial order. Requests for admissions are usually presented in
such a fashion that only a direct answer can be given and, if
necessary, direct answers can be compelled under Federal Rule
36(a). Both stipulations and requests for admissions are admissible as evidence whereas interrogatories are seldom, if ever,
admitted into evidence. The initial limitation on the number of
interrogatories that can be served without leave of court is expected to encourage litigants to use stipulations and requests for
admissions to obtain evidence concerning uncontested facts. The
question is whether Local Rule 9(g) is the appropriate means
to accomplish this result. The apparent invalidity of the local
rule would seem to require a negative answer.
If the courts were to exercise the power granted them under
Federal Rule 3783 to command the correct use of the discovery
methods, interrogatories would be put into their proper perspective. The district court would have the power to compel direct
answers to questions dealing with contested facts and sanction
a party who has abused the discovery process. If litigants realize
they will pay the costs of any motion they unjustifiably induce,
more care might be taken in the answering and serving of interrogatories. Interrogatories would thereby accomplish the purposes of narrowing the issues, obtaining facts and allowing a litigant to initially prepare for trial.
(II)

Objections

The second reason for the enactment of Local Rule 9(g) concerns the number of objections raised by the voluminous interrogatories. Judge Will feels that attorneys have not, in the past,
given sufficient consideration to the context and number of interrogatories, which has resulted in numerous objections to meaningless or annoying questions. It is expected that by limiting
the number of interrogatories that can be served without leave
of court, attorneys will give more thought to preparing fewer
interrogatories which will result in worthwhile discovery
through more meaningful and relevant questions. However,
Federal Rule 37 is a two-edged sword that can be used against
83. 1970 ADvisoRY CommrFZ Norw, supra note 29, at 540:
The present provision of Rule 37 (a) that the court shall require
payment if it finds that the defeated party acted without substantial
justification may appear adequate, but in fact it has been little used.
Only a handful of reported cases include an award of expenses, and
the Columbia Survey found that in only one instance out of about
50 motions decided under Rule 37(a) did the court award expenses.
It appears that the courts do not utilize the most important available
sanction to deter abusive resort to the judiciary.
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a belligerent interrogator as well as a reluctant interrogated
party.
Subdivision (a) (4) of Federal Rule 37 provides for the award
of expenses against the moving party for an unjustified motion
to compel discovery under subdivision (a) (2).114 This section of
subdivision (a) (4) was intended to help prevent unwarranted
motions to compel discovery by a moving party who cannot justify his demand that an interrogatory be answered.8 5 The
Advisory Committee made the award of costs mandatory for
unjustified failure to answer and also for unjustified motions
to compel discovery in order to avoid time-consuming judicial
intervention in matters that could be reconciled between the parties. 6 If either party forces judicial intervention without
proper reasons, that party will pay the resulting costs incurred
by the other party.
Federal Rule 37 forces a party to think twice before either
not answering a relevant interrogatory or demanding the court
to compel an answer to a useless or impermissible interrogatory
by subjecting that party to the penalty of costs for abusing discovery. These sanctions are meant to persuade the parties to
resolve any conflict out of court, and thereby lessen the number
of objections caused by the use of interrogatories and free the
courts from the burden of time-consuming hearings on these
87
objections.
Expenses, however, do not have to be awarded in all
instances. If both parties show sufficient cause for their respective action, neither party will be forced to pay the entire expense
of the motion and each will simply bear his own costs. 8 When
both parties do have sufficient cause and cannot resolve the
matter between themselves, Federal Rule 37 recognizes that the
court is the proper place to seek a just solution and no penalty
will be assessed for justified judicial intervention.
The interrogated party can also seek a protective order under
Federal Rule 26(c) if he believes the interrogatories to be annoying, embarrassing, oppressive, unduly burdensome or expensive.8 9 The last paragraph of Federal Rule 26(c) provides that
84. See note 75 supra; 1970 ADVISORY COM uiTE NOTE, supra. note 29,
at 539; A Guide to Discovery, supra note 57, at 74.
85. See 1970 ADVISORY CoMMITTEE NOTE, supra note 29, at 488, 53940; Proposed Changes to Rules 33 & 37, supra note 81, at 447; WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 18, § 2288.
86. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2288; Proposed Changes to
Rules 33 & 37, supra note 81, at 447.

87. See note 86 supra; 4A MOORE'S

FEDERAL

PRACTICE

37.02 [10] (2d

ed. 1975).
88. 1970 ADVISORY COMMITTEE NoE supra note 29, at 540; WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 18, § 2173.
89. 1970 ADVISORY COMMrITEE NOTE, supra note 29, at 522.
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if a motion for a protective order is denied, the court may compel the party who sought the order to comply with discovery and
the costs incurred in responding to the motion can be assessed
against the moving party under the provisions of Federal Rule
37(a) (4). 90 This section of Federal Rule 26(c) gives the district
court the power to award costs against a party who unjustifiably
seeks a protective order. 9 1 Therefore, while Federal Rule 26(c)
allows an interrogated party to seek protection from annoying,
embarrassing or unduly burdensome interrogatories, it also provides that the penalty of costs in Federal Rule 37(a) (4) is
applicable if an unjustified protective order is sought.
Thus, misuse of discovery can be adequately controlled
through the applicable subdivisions of Federal Rules 26 and 37.
There is no gap in the control of the abuses enumerated by Judge
Will which would necessitate the enactment of a local rule under
the provisions of Federal Rule 83.
(III)

Costs

The third reason given for enactment of Local Rule 9 (g) is
that abuse of interrogatories has resulted in higher legal costs to
clients in this district. Judge Will explains that a client is billed
for the time needed to formulate and serve interrogatories and,
in addition, for any time that is required either to seek a court
order compelling answers or to defend a failure to answer in
such a hearing. While the intention is commendable, the means
in this instance are not justified by the outcome, which can be
achieved by application of the Federal Rules.
Costs incurred through the misuse of interrogatories can be
reduced by using Federal Rule 37 to insure that interrogatories
are used effectively. If a court were to apply the provisions of
Federal Rule 37 properly, attorneys would be forced to carefully
consider the correct use of interrogatories. How often would litigants be willing to take the risk of: (1) incurring more costs;
(2) admitting facts which may be untrue; (3) being unable to
"support or oppose designated claims or defenses" or "introducing designated matters in evidence"; (4) pleadings being struck,
90. See note 27 supra, subdivision (c).
91. 1970 ADvisOy COMMITrEE NOTE, supra note 29, at 505 (citations
omitted):
The subdivision contains new matter relating to sanctions.
When a motion for a protective order is made and the court is disposed to deny it, the court may go a step further and issue an order
to provide or permit discovery. This will bring the sanctions of Rule
37 (b) directly into play. Since the court has heard the contentions
of all interested persons, an affirmative order is justified. In addition, the court may require the payment of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
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dismissal of the action or a default judgment; or (5) contempt of
court, by objecting to a relevant interrogatory or disobeying a
court order to answer the same? 92 Although these penalties
can be quite severe, they can be avoided by adhering to the spirit
and intent of discovery. Most attorneys would find it difficult
to explain such sanctions to their clients and would be more
likely to use discovery in its intended fashion in order to avoid
possible conflict with a client over increased costs or other sanctions that can be imposed by a district court for abuse of interrogatories.
CHALLENGING LocAL RULE 9 (g)

To challenge the validity of Local Rule 9(g), the appropriate
method of judicial review must first be determined. Title 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292 provide for appeals. Section 1291 governs the appeal of final decisions of the district courts. A final
decision is defined as "one which ends the litigation on the merits
and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."93 Denying a party the right to serve more than twenty
interrogatories, however, is not a decision based on the merits
of the case.
Section 1291 also covers collateral orders which are "claims
of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action, too important to be denied review and too independent
of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 94 If a party is
denied the right to serve more than twenty interrogatories under
Local Rule 9(g), that denial will be based on those specific interrogatories in excess of twenty for which good cause could not
be shown. This does not, however, preclude a party from continuing discovery under one of the other discovery devices, or
submitting other interrogatories if a showing of good cause can
be made for their service. The right to serve those specific interrogatories over twenty which were denied would not, therefore,
be so important that appellate review is immediately necessary.
Thus, a party will not be able to appeal the question of the validity of Local Rule 9 (g) under section 1291, either as a final decision or as a collateral order.95
Section 1292(b) 96 allows for an appeal of interlocutory
92. The sanction of costs is provided for in Federal Rule 37(a) (4);
the other sanctions are provided for in Federal Rule 37(b) if a court
order governing discovery is disobeyed.
93. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); see also C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 101 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as LAw or FEnAL COURTS].
94. LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, supra note

93, § 101.
95. WRIGHr & MLER, supra note 18, § 2006 n.63.
96. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a) (1958), lists specific orders that can be
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decisions if a district court judge will certify the decision as one
which involves a "controlling question of law as to which there
is substantial ground for difference of opinion. '97 The appeal
must proceed from an order that may "materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation."98 It is doubtful that
denial of service of more than twenty interrogatories would
be considered a "controlling question of law." Since there are
alternative methods of discovery available, and more interrogatories may be served if good cause is shown, an order denying
service of certain interrogatories over twenty, because good cause
was allegedly not shown, will not be an order which "materially
advances the ultimate termination of the litigation." Thus,
section 1292(b) does not provide for appeal of the validity of
Local Rule 9(g).99
A writ of mandamus' 0 0 appears to be the appropriate
means to challenge the validity of Local Rule 9(g). In the Miner
case,' 0 ' the district court granted respondent's motion to depose
petitioner in accordance with a local admiralty rule. Petitioner
sought a writ of mandamus to test the validity of the local rule.
It appears mandamus would be the logical procedure to follow
in challenging the validity of Local Rule 9 (g).
In order to have standing to challenge, 10 2 it would be
necessary for a party to have a case pending in the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. The party would then have
to attempt to serve more than twenty interrogatories upon
another party and have this request denied by the district court.
Denying the request to serve more than twenty interrogatories
would directly affect the party wishing to challenge the validity
of Local Rule 9 (g) ,by forcing either the use of the more expensive means of depositions to continue discovery or the preparation of new interrogatories which would be more costly to the
litigant. Thus, the issue of the validity of Local Rule 9(g)
would be justiciable105
appealed. This section does not pertain to orders dealing with local rules
and is not applicable to the present discussion.
97. Id. § 1292(b).
98. Id.
99. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2006 n.73.
100. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1964):
The traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction
both at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine
an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction.
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26. The District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois has gone beyond its prescribed jurisdiction by enacting an invalid local rule that is beyond
the rule-making power of the federal district courts as held in Miner.
101. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
102. LAw oF FEDERAL Counrs, supra note 93, § 13.
103. Id. A justiciable case is one in which plaintiff can show that a
statute is invalid and that he has or will sustain a direct injury if the
statute is enforced.
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The problem, however, is that it is unlikely that the above
requirements will be met in the near future. Seeking a writ
of mandamus involves costs that clients and attorneys may not
be willing to incur in order to make the challenge. As a result,
many attorneys may prefer to live with Local Rule 9(g), rather
than assume the burden of challenging the validity of this rule.
Accordingly, Local Rule 9 (g) may remain despite its invalidity.
CONCLUSION

Judge Will does not believe Federal Rules 26 and 33 prevent
the implication of a fixed limitation on the frequency of use of
interrogatories if it is a preliminary limitation. He believes Local
Rule 9 (g) does not conflict with the Federal Rules and is a direct
means of putting the use of interrogatories into proper perspective as compared to Federal Rule 37. Judge Will stated that
courts are reluctant to impose the sanctions of Federal Rule 37
because these are civil penalties which are used only when there
has been extraordinary abuse of discovery.
The fact remains, however, that Federal Rules 26(c) and 33
do not allow for any fixed limitation whether preliminary or permanent. Local Rule 9(g) makes a basic procedural change by
requiring an interrogator to prove the validity of any interrogatory in excess of twenty that he wishes to serve upon another
party. This type of change can not be made by a local rule as
the United States Supreme Court -has stated in Miner. Federal
Rule 37 does give the district courts the power to control any
abuse of discovery even though it may be felt to be an indirect
method of control. There is no gap, therefore, in the Federal
Rules which would allow for the enactment of Local Rule 9 (g).
Unfortunately, Local Rule 9(g) will remain unless someone
is willing and able to challenge its validity. However, the burden
of making such a challenge may deter attorneys from seeking
a writ of mandamus to test this rule. Therefore, the judges of
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois should
seriously consider repealing Local Rule 9(g) on their own
initiative.
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